Modern Psychological Studies
Volume 28

Number 1

Article 4

2022

An Exploration Of The Relation between Neighborhood Resource,
Crime, And The Development Of Paranoia.
Ojus Khanolkar
University of Illinois, Chicago, okhano2@uic.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.utc.edu/mps
Part of the Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Khanolkar, Ojus (2022) "An Exploration Of The Relation between Neighborhood Resource, Crime, And The
Development Of Paranoia.," Modern Psychological Studies: Vol. 28: No. 1, Article 4.
Available at: https://scholar.utc.edu/mps/vol28/iss1/4

This articles is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals, Magazines, and Newsletters at UTC
Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Modern Psychological Studies by an authorized editor of UTC Scholar.
For more information, please contact scholar@utc.edu.

1

Abstract:
Schizophrenia is characterized, often, by the positive symptom paranoia, which can be caused by
stressors like income, crime, diet, and trauma. But, is it possible that "schizophrenic" behavior is
not indicative of impending psychosis but rather a coping mechanism to environmental stressors?
This paper explores how paranoia could function as a coping mechanism to stressors, poverty
and crime, through a computer-simulation of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Results showed
that paranoia was directly related to crime, regardless of poverty level, but in no-crime
neighborhoods, individuals in poverty showed less paranoia than did those in high-income areas.
Therefore, individuals in poorer areas with higher crime display paranoia in response to a
dangerous environment, not as a potential indication of schizophrenia.
Keywords: schizophrenia, paranoia, crime, poverty, environmental factors, social
psychology
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An Exploration Of The Relation between Neighborhood Resource, Crime, And The
Development Of Paranoia.
SNL, with its long history of using humor to attack serious social issues, has a
particularly poignant recurring skit, involving a fake game called “Black Jeopardy.” The skit
focuses on the issues in Black America-- particularly issues regarding governmental intervention,
and distrust of large governmental bodies. The skit uses outrageous humor to show how from
slavery through Jim Crow, to the current brutalization of young Blacks by the police, Black
Americans are rightly wary of large government power. This unhealed, racial trauma has
consequences, as summed up by author Resmaa Menakem when he wrote, “Trauma in a person,
decontextualized over time, looks like personality. Trauma in a family, decontextualized over
time, looks like family traits. Trauma in a people, decontextualized, looks like culture.” This
“decontextualized trauma” spills into every facet of life, even medicine. Jonathan Metzl (2010),
the author of Protest Psychosis: How Schizophrenia Became a Black Disease, states that Black
men are around 4x more likely to be diagnosed with psychosis illnesses like schizophrenia than
their White counterparts, and he posits that the diagnosis of diseases like schizophrenia in the
Black population have a much larger sociological component (not just a psychological and
environmental component). In his book, he proves that this is due to the inherently ambiguous
nature of mental illness diagnosis coupled with the lack of awareness of issues facing specifically
the Black population through the years and the politicization of Black issues through history.
Schizophrenia was historically diagnosed most frequently in White women, and was
largely considered non-threatening as a disease. But during the Black Power movement, Black
males, already culturally understood as dangerous, became more likely to be diagnosed with
schizophrenia. The reconceptualization of schizophrenia as a “Black disease” was rooted in
articles stating that schizophrenic symptomology was influenced by social pressures like the
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Civil Rights Movement or Black Muslim ideology (Metzl, 2010). In addition, Metzl also
attributes this change in diagnosis to modifications in the DSM-II. In an effort to align the DSM
to international definitions of mental illnesses, diseases were no longer listed as “reactions,” as
they were in DSM-I (Metzl, 2010), shifting the focus of underlying causes of disease from
potentially environmental to indicating an intrinsic disorder. In addition, the DSM also adopted
masculine pronouns as opposed to gender-neutral pronouns used in DSM-I (Metzl, 2010).
According to Metzl, “Masculinized hostility was so central to the revised diagnosis that it formed
its own subtype of paranoid schizophrenia”(Metzl, 2010). Previous diagnoses like sociopathic
personality or antisocial personality were changed to paranoid schizophrenia to keep up with the
changing literature. Science and politics converged to overdiagnose a whole generation of Black
men as schizophrenic. This problem continues to persist; Black men are still overdiagnosed with
schizophrenia, partly due to the emphasis clinicians place on paranoia (Johnson, 2015). This
clinical preference, coupled with the implicit distrust that Black communities have for agents in
power, does little to reduce the overdiagnosis of schizophrenia in Black men, nor does it address
issues of distrust in the Black community. Recently, paranoid behavior has been linked to
contextual factors like poverty and crime (Wickam, 2014), but is it possible that this link may
fall prey to the same pitfall that has led to this overdiagnosis? This paper explores the possibility
that paranoid behavior in response to crime and poverty may not be an indicator of
schizophrenia, but rather simply an adaptation to a high risk environment.
What Are Schizophrenia and Paranoia?
It is important to first consider what schizophrenia and paranoia are, and how they are
measured. Schizophrenia is defined as a disorder in which people perceive reality abnormally
(NIMH, 2020). The symptoms of schizophrenia are divided into positive (meaning symptoms
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that appear in individuals with schizophrenia) and negative symptoms (attributes that are
diminished, or disappear in individuals with schizophrenia). Positive symptoms are delusions,
hallucinations and disorganized speech. The negative symptoms are flattened affect (lack of
emotion), reduced speech, and lack of initiative. Paranoid behavior (sometimes also called
suspiciousness), falls under delusional perception-- a positive symptom, which typically
manifests as delusions of persecution, or the feeling that someone or an organization is “out to
get you”(Miller, 2003). When diagnosing schizophrenia, patients should present with at least two
symptoms (either two positive symptoms, two negative symptoms, or a combination thereof).
Current Problems with Measuring Paranoia:
Current diagnostic tools (Positive And Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) and the
Structured Interview for Prodromal Syndromes (SIPS)) are not robust. Each uses metrics based
on a single question, and a scale with limited social range that doesn’t take into account the
patient’s cultural context and social identities (Ellett, 2013). The PANSS defines paranoid
behavior as “ideas of persecution, as reflected in guardedness, a distrustful attitude, suspicious
hypervigilance, or frank delusions that others mean harm” (Lavin et al, 2019), and uses a
quantitative number with a strict cutoff to classify a behavior. The SIPS measures prodromal
schizophrenia (which is the presence of schizophrenic symptoms in a patient that has not reached
psychosis), but acknowledges that paranoid behavior runs on a continuum with normal social
functioning (Miller et al, 2003). In addition, around 62% of clinicians use incorrect calculations
in administering the PANSS (Obermier, 2011), and only 40% of patients labeled clinically high
risk (CHR) on the SIPS convert to full psychosis in a 2.5 year follow up study (Pearson, 2012).
Even though the PANSS and SIPS are the most trusted surveys to determine psychosis, perhaps
there is room for improvement--a way to consider the individual patient’s manifestation of the
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symptom relative to their environment, especially since paranoia is one of the best indicators of
schizophrenia spectrum disorder (Johnson et al, 2009).
Other Ways Of Measuring Paranoia:
Johnson et al seeks to measure paranoia through interpersonal relationships. Paranoia is
best seen in scenarios that require a decision to be made without knowing how the other person
will react--individuals who are paranoid will display impractical risk aversion. Johnson et al
(2009) looked at the difference between risk aversion and paranoia through an experiment
involving repeated iterations of the Minnesota Trust Game; a game used by behavioral
economists and social scientists to understand interpersonal trust--the ability to trust a stranger.
The Minnesota Trust Game requires subjects to decide either to invest in a partner with the hope
that the partner will return a larger sum or select an assured payoff, where money is guaranteed
to be returned. If the subject decides to invest in the partner, there is a chance that the partner
might not return the money, or return a smaller amount than the loan.
This interaction is crucial for determining the difference between an individual suffering
from paranoia, and an individual who is simply distrustful. Johnson creates a scenario where the
partner payoff is high in reward and more likely. In these situations, the distrustful individual
will opt for the payoff determined by the partner because it is more economical. However, in the
event that the participant is suffering from paranoia that is a symptom of schizophrenia, the
participant will always opt for the assured payoff, not because of an economic decision, but
because they believe that “others harbor malicious intentions towards him or her” (Johnson et al
2015, 31). This differentiation between rational mistrust and actual paranoia forms the basis for
differentiating the effects of poverty on paranoid behavior, and is incorporated into the model in
this paper by creating a bound when analyzing the paranoid behavior agents: if they defect too
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much, it would be evident of paranoia, but if less than the bound, it would simply be rational
mistrust.
The Question & A Brief Overview of the Project:
The link between neighborhood crime and individual risk of paranoia was posed by
Wilson et al (2015). Individuals were assessed using the SIPS, and their neighborhood was
analyzed against a crime index. It was found that more than any other positive or negative
symptom on the SIPS test, paranoia and neighborhood crime were most closely related, across
age, gender, and race. “Neighborhood composition and relative social disadvantage increase the
incidence of psychosis, even after controlling for individual factors” (Wilson et al, 2015). The
paper does state, however, that links between poverty, crime, and environment can create stress,
which may play into genetic predispositions towards psychosis, although this concept is not
explored in their paper. However, as stated earlier, the SIPS, while a heavily used tool, isn’t
necessarily a reliable source for diagnosis. Therefore, would it be possible to explore this link
between neighborhood crime and individual risk of paranoia through an interpersonal
relationship similar to Johnson et al (2009)?
The paper seeks to explore this connection between neighborhood crime and paranoia
using an agent based model. Using an agent-based model to understand mental health is not a
novel concept. Creating a computerized, agent-based model only requires assigning agents (the
interacting individuals in the simulation) with basic instructions on how to interact in the
environment. The researcher can then observe how sociological phenomena can emerge
dynamically from interactions between the agents and the environment. Kalton et al (2016) made
use of that principle by programming local interactions such as the choice of taking medication
to manage a mental illness, or the interaction between a healthcare worker and patient with a
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mental illness, and accumulating events to observe for larger phenomena, like healthcare costs or
incarceration rates (Kalton et al 2016). Kalton’s model consisted of seventy-five input variables
to model care coordination, rates of incarceration, hospitalization, and patient compliance, and
was able to show how these disparate phenomena can influence each other to affect rates of
recidivism, and patient compliance. The concept of programming agents with instructions and
subsequently observing the overall system was used in this model to understand the association
between neighborhood poverty and the risk of paranoia.
This paper explores how paranoia commonly thought to be indicative of schizophrenia
may actually be rational mistrust exacerbated by the environment through an agent based model
that uses the Prisoner's Dilemma. A computer model using the Prisoner’s Dilemma will be
implemented with three separate behavior strategies, one that is always positive, one that mimics
greed-based negative interactions, and one that mimics paranoia, through distrust-based negative
interactions. Two basic experiments were conducted: the first set of experiments, called the
baseline set, determined the correlation between neighborhood resources and paranoid behavior
without the inclusion of crime. The second set of experiments, called the environmental set,
determined a direct causal relationship between paranoid behavior and resource levels with the
inclusion of crime and determined the existence of a relationship between crime and poverty.
Methods:
Terminology: The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma & Agent Based Modeling:
The model makes use of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma interaction. The Prisoner’s
Dilemma is a game theory phenomenon created by American mathematician Albert W. Tucker.
The game presents a hypothetical scenario of a police officer questioning two partners in
separate holding cells, who are suspects in a crime. The officer gives each partner the chance to
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either confess to the crime, or blame the other partner. If both partners confess to the crime, they
spend 4 years incarcerated. If one partner blames while the other partner confesses, the confessor
spends 8 years in prison while the other walks free. If neither partner confesses, they spend 6
months. The important caveat is the partners cannot know what the other partner’s choice is; the
game simulates how individuals behave in an interaction when they are unaware of how the
other individual in the interaction will react. If both partners choose to cooperate with each other
(not confess), this would show a high level of trust between the two partners. On the other hand,
if either partner defects (chooses to confess), this would show a relatively low level of trust
between the two. This information is summarized in Table 1 (see Appendix A). These two
behaviors (confessing or not confessing) form the basis of the model. This game can be played
over and over again, amongst several different agents, creating the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
(IPD) game.
From a neutral, single-interation, perspective, it seems clear that both partners should
confess, because they both get the lowest amount of time in prison. But when analyzed from the
viewpoint of the agent, the two main choices are confessing, which would lead to no time in jail,
or defecting, which would lead to 8 years in prison. In this case, it is most economically sound to
blame the other partner. However, as this game gets played multiple times, this payoff ends up
not being ideal. The most natural behavior that maximizes payoff is a mix between cooperation
at times and defecting at others (Axelrod’s Tournament, 2019). The ability to both cooperate and
defect was instrumental in determining whether an individual was normal, or exhibiting signs of
paranoia indicative of schizophrenia.
What are Agents in Agent-Based Modeling?
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For this research project, IPD was implemented using the agent-based-modeling
software, Netlogo. This created a virtual environment for playing IPD that could model varying
levels of neighborhood resource and crime, which helped establish a distinction between a
normative response and response potentially indicative of a mental illness. This is important
because the model, without resource and crime changes, is unable to account for internal aspects
of mental illness, like the reasoning behind a specific action (since the IPD model is an
interpersonal model). So mental illnesses modeled by IPD can only be observed by the external
symptoms. Ultimately, since both paranoid individuals and individuals who have a rational level
of mistrust (which will be referred to as “rational mistrust”) defect in a single, given interaction,
the major difference between a rational mistrust player and a paranoid individual is the capacity
for change. A paranoid individual will always defect (meaning they do not confess) regardless of
the environmental context and over a multitude of interactions. However, a rational-mistrustindividual will stop defecting, or start cooperating (meaning they will confess), when placed in
an environment where there is no longer a need to be distrustful. This was measured using a
defection rate: a self-modifying scale that reflected the total number of times a particular
individual defected over all interactions. The level of defection reflected the mental state of the
individual. An emotionally neutral human playing IPD would defect around 40% of the time
(Eimontate et al, 2013). An angry individual playing IPD would defect around 60% of the time
(Eimontate et al, 2013). Anything above this level would be considered paranoid--easily
attributable to schizophrenia. However, as has been stated, paranoia and rational mistrust exists
on a spectrum, the only difference being that a paranoid individual would continue to defect even
when in an environment when it’s not necessary. This would be seen in a very high defection
rate, like a defection rate over 90%. When translated into a computerized agent based model,
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these “individuals” become “agents” as per correct terminology. Agents that reached a defection
rate above 90% were considered paranoid. Between a defection rate above 60%, but below 90%,
individuals exhibited rational mistrust, and a defection rate between 40-60% was considered
normal. Every paranoia agent (the virtual individual whose emotional response is being
measured through the model) had a defection rate that starts out at 40% (Eimontate et al, 2013),
as this was the defection rate for an emotionally neutral human playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Based on the environment, and who the agent encounters (cooperators, defectors, or other
paranoia agents), the defection rate can increase or decrease by a single percentage point. There
were three types of agents playing: cooperator agents who never defected and who acted,
simplistically, as another member of society; defector agents who always defected and served as
a measure of crime, otherwise known as greed-based defection; and paranoia agents who were
normal and had the capacity to defect or cooperate based on how their defection rate changed
throughout the game. When a paranoia agent’s defection rate increases to 100%, they look
similar to defector agents, however defector agents’ behavior are greed motivated while paranoia
agents’ behavior is motivated by distrust.
There are several advantages to using agents in a computer model rather than recruiting
participants to play an iteration (or several) of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. First of all, having agents
who, apart from their behavior, are otherwise identical, neutralizes participant differences that
would contribute to sampling biases. In addition, other internal variables that can contribute to
the presentation of mental illnesses like genetics and internal state of mind are not considered.
This uniformity amongst the agents controls the environment, creating an experiment with better
internal validity. In addition, it is difficult to prove a causative relationship between
neighborhood resource, crime, and paranoia in the real world because it’s extraordinarily
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difficult and highly unethical to experimentally test these hypotheses on a human population.
However, in an agent-based model, by imbibing the agents with instructions on their behavior, it
is quite simple to experiment with resource density and crime and observe how these changes
impact the concentrations of defectors and paranoid agents numerically change in the population.
In addition, computerized, agent-based models don’t rely on one interview to label an individual
as having paranoid tendencies. Establishing a paranoia diagnosis over multiple interactions rather
than reducing it to one interview between a clinician in power and a patient reduces error.
Finally, the use of a computer model with agents, rather than an in person experiment with
participants allows for multiple interactions to be observed at the same time, and then aggregated
and analyzed quickly.
Outlining the Interaction:
Programming the Prisoner’s Dilemma model consists of three main parts: outlining the
interaction, tying the interactions to “resource patches” (a square piece of ground in the twodimensional environment), and finally augmenting the interaction with a genetic algorithm.
The first part of creating the interaction was building the framework for the interactions
between the agents. Each interaction is conducted according to the rules of the Prisoner's
Dilemma model. The gains and the losses are measured through the decision matrix presented in
Table 2 (see Appendix A). The agents move around the virtual environment until they face
another agent. At this point, the interaction is carried out, and then the agents continue to move
randomly through the space. In Table 2, which contains the distribution breakdown, a turtle is
synonymous with an agent.
The next step was to tie the interactions between the agents to the resource patches. In the
two dimensional world of NetLogo, the environmental variable of neighborhood resources was
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controlled by the number and concentration of resource patches. The visualized Netlogo model
consists of agents on a grid made of squares, or patches. Resource patches had a different color
from the surrounding patches in the environment, and the presence of a resource patch indicated
the presence of resources, which are needed for the agent to live, on that square. This was
important because in order to determine the effect of resource scarcity on behavior, the only
place to test the interactions was when two agents were deciding how to share a resource on the
resource patch. The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma was modified to only have interactions which
involve the sharing of tangible resources in lieu of prison time. The aim of the agents is to
accumulate as many resource units as possible and subsequently reproduce (which will be
discussed in the genetics algorithm). In the event that an agent lands on a resource patch and
there are no nearby agents as partners, the agent can extract one resource unit. In the event that
there is another agent who lands on the same patch, they interact using the Prisoner’s Dilemma
to divide or allocate the single resource. Any interactions that don’t take place on resource
patches don’t involve the sharing/distribution of resources and therefore are not counted. There
are two substeps: the first is to create the resource patches, and the second is to modify the
interaction to only work on the resource patches--which includes modifying the payoff. The
model would stop running when there were no resources left.
The first sub-step was to populate the environment with resource patches. The number of
resource patches was decided with a sliding scale that could be modified before running the
model. The distribution of patches with resources was accomplished by creating a distribution
variable (that could be modified between trials) and assigning each patch a number. If the patch
number was smaller than the distribution variable, it was colored green, and assigned 100
resource units. That patch was now a resource patch. Else it remained black. Agents began with a
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stock of 50 resources and need to acquire additional resources to survive and propagate. As
agents move through the environment, they move onto green or black patches patches that either
do or don’t contain resources (respectively). The total number of resource patches available
models neighborhood poverty (a poorer neighborhood will have fewer patches scattered through
the environment and a more affluent neighborhood will have a larger density of resource patches
in the environment). In the event that an agent lands on a patch that contains resources, and no
other agent is also on that patch, they are free to take 1 resource unit from the patch. When
agents have no resources, they die. When agents have 50 resources, they can propagate. When a
resource patch has no more resource units, it becomes black.
In the event that there are two agents on the same resource patch, then there has to be a
way to divide the 1 resource unit between the two of them that also reflects the potential
outcomes of IPD. In the event that both agents cooperate (which in a regular play of the
Prisoners Dilemma, the individuals refuse to confess), they each get ½ of the resource unit. In the
event that one agent defects (confesses)and the other one cooperates (does not confess), the agent
that defects gets 1 resource unit while the other agent gets nothing. In the event that both agents
defect (confess), neither of them get the resource. Because of the extractive process of the game,
it is expected that neighborhood poverty will increase as the game progresses (the number of
resources on each patch and the number of resource patches will decrease). After each
interaction, the defection probability of the paranoia agents is reevaluated. In the event that the
paranoia agent’s partner defected (confessed), the defection rate of the paranoia agent was
increased by 1, and that particular agent was now more likely to defect in a future interaction. In
the event that the paranoia agent’s partner cooperated (didn’t confess), the defection rate was
decreased by 1, and that agent was more likely to cooperate on the next interaction. The defection
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rate was bounded between 0 and 100, with 0 indicating pure trust in another person, like a
cooperator agent, and 100 indicating paranoia symptomatic of schizophrenia, which looks like a
defector but again, does not happen out of malice but rather distrust based on prior history. The
experiment stops when there are no more resources available. This happens when all of the
patches are depleted of resources.
The last step of the model was to create a genetic algorithm. The genetic algorithm only
allows agents above a certain score to propagate, and this is used to determine which behavior is
adaptively beneficial. For now, the threshold number of resources required for propagation is 50,
after which, the agent’s score will drop to 25, and the new agent will start with a score of 12.5 as
well as the same behavior as the parent. Initially the scores of the new agent were set to 40 and
the old agents were left with 10, but these did not yield observable test runs. It was found that
these scores of 25 for the old agent and 12.5 for the new agent allows for observable test runs. It
was assumed that as the number of resource patches increased, the total number of agents would
increase.
The Experiments:
Three experiments were conducted to analyze the relationship between neighborhood
resources, crime, and risk of developing non-clinical paranoia.
The first experiments, called the baseline set, tried to determine the correlation between
neighborhood resources and paranoid behavior without the inclusion of crime. Therefore, the
experiment only consisted of the paranoia agents (whose behavior the model is trying to
measure) and the cooperator agents. The number of paranoia agents and cooperators was kept at
20. The entire experiment consisted of 10 trials. Each trial changed the resource density,
incrementing by 5%. The average rate of defection of all paranoia agents and the number of
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paranoid agents at the end of each trial (when there were no resources left) was monitored
through the course of the experiment.
The second set of experiments, called the environmental set, served two purposes. First
the environmental set aimed to establish a relationship between poverty and paranoid behavior in
the presence of crime. Secondly the environmental set tried to determine the existence of a
relationship between defective behavior and poverty--essentially which behavior was rewarded
at lower resource densities. The number of defectors, paranoia agents, and cooperators was set to
20 at the beginning of every trial. The only factor that changed was the resource level, which
incremented by 5% every trial (like the baseline experiment). The average defection rate of
paranoia agents, the number of paranoia agents, and the number of defector and cooperator
agents was measured through the course of the trial.
A third set of experiments, called the combined experiment, was also conducted to
determine whether a gradation of crime across resource densities could potentially affect
paranoid behavior. This third set of experiments had a similar setup to the baseline set: it
consisted of 20 cooperators, and 20 paranoia agents, but increased its resource density by 25%
increments with each trial. At each resource density, 20 trials were run, each time increasing the
number of starting defectors by 1. This was done to determine which environmental factor had
more of an impact--resource density or crime. Again, like in the baseline experiment, the
changes in defection rate and number of paranoia based defectors was measured.
The aim of all three experiments was to determine whether operating in an environment
without sufficient resources can give rise to nonclinical paranoid behavior. Due to the random
nature of agent based modeling, each trial can yield different results even if the parameters are
kept constant. Therefore, it was imperative that models using each combination of parameters
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was run at least 10 times. For all experiments, unless otherwise indicated, the number of agents
of each behavior was set at the beginning to 20. Using 20 agents at the beginning for all trials
provided a good baseline. Too few agents, and they died quickly, but not before hastily
propagating, leading to an unmanageable concentration of agents in the environment, also
making that particular trial unobservable. Too many agents, and the evolutionary advantage of
different behaviors was not observable, because they didn’t reach the score threshold to
propagate.
It was expected that as the resource density decreases, the number of paranoid agents
would increase, as would the defection rate for the paranoia agents. This effect would be
compounded by the presence of a significant number of defector agents (representing crime). In
addition, it was expected that the number of paranoia agents will also increase if there are
defectors present regardless of the resource level, illustrating that high crime will affect a
neighborhood regardless of income level.
Results:
The aim of the baseline experiment was to determine a relationship between average
neighborhood income and defector (confessing) behavior in “paranoia” agents. As the poverty of
the environment increases, it was expected that the defection rate of paranoia agents would also
increase. What was seen across the trials, was as the resource density increased, the defection
rate went down from around 40% (when the resource density was around 0%, which is also the
starting defection point for all paranoia agents) to 0 (when the resource density was 100%). This
finding was significant (p <0.05) and had an r = -0.37. This means that paranoia agents' behavior
resembles cooperative agent’s behavior in areas of high resource density. In addition, paranoid
behavior triggered by the environment is not strongly associated with high-resource
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neighborhoods. A negative relationship between the starting resource density and the end
number of paranoid agents was also observed; the number of paranoia agents went from 1400 (at
20% resource density) to 200 (at 100% resource density). This was a strong correlation (r = 0.609) that was significant (p < 0.05), and it could mean that individuals in high resource
neighborhoods are less likely to display paranoid behavior potentially symptomatic of
schizophrenia, because that behavior is not rewarded at higher resource densities. These findings
are summarized in Figure 1 and Figure 2 (see Appendix B).
However, it’s clear that the environment of the baseline trial is not indicative of the real
world, as it does not account at all for crime. The environmental trials looked at the relationship
between neighborhood resources and development of paranoia in the presence of crime and are
shown mostly in Figure 3 (see Appendix C). Figure 3 seems to not show a strong, but still
significant, correlation between resource density and rate of defection of paranoid agents (r =
0.11, p < 0.05), with the numbers hovering between 47% and 53% defection. In comparing these
to Figure 2 (the baseline experiment with no crime, that saw a negative relationship between
resource density and rate of defection), it’s clear that even at levels of high resource density,
crime plays a factor in a paranoid individuals’ behavior--it just isn’t enough to make an agent
present with paranoid symptoms indicative of schizophrenia. In low resource neighborhoods,
defection was simply a reaction to the environment, as defection did not become their standard
behavior. In fact, contrary to the expectations, paranoia agents in low income resource
neighborhoods with the presence of crime did not develop a paranoid defection rate (as in a
defection rate above 60%). However, the defection rates at low resource densities in the
environmental experiment are still higher than the defection rates at low densities in the baseline
experiment, but this is likely due to a scarcity mentality, which is exacerbated when there is both
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poverty and high crime in an environment. Figure 4 (in Appendix C), which is meant to show
most rewarded behavior, also clearly exemplifies that increasing resource density is accompanied
by a lower population; among paranoia agents the peak population is 1200 paranoid individuals
at a resource density of 20%. At 100% resource density, the paranoid population is 200. This
trend was also observed in the baseline experiments, indicating that this finding is independent of
the presence of crime.
The environmental experiments also examined which behaviors were rewarded at lower
neighborhood resources by measuring the number of defectors and cooperators in addition to the
number of paranoia agents. As the resource density of the environment increased, it was found
that the number of cooperator agents decreased (see Figure 4, Appendix C). The peak was at
20% resource density, where the number of paranoia agents was around 700 individuals. A
similar pattern was seen for the relationship between resource density and defectors (crime),
though the peak population of defectors was significantly higher: 2000 agents at a resource
density of 10%. The relationship between paranoia and resource density was already explored in
the results of the previous hypothesis of the environmental experiments. Overall, it was clear that
at low resource density, defection behavior (crime) was heavily rewarded, and following
behavior was paranoia-based defectors. Cooperators were least rewarded at low resourcedensities.
The final experiment, the combined experiment, modified resource density as well as the
number of defectors. The results from this experiment should be compared to Figures 1 and 2,
which looked at resource density vs. paranoid behavior with no defectors (no crime), or to
Figures 3 and 4, which looked at the resource density vs. paranoid behavior with 20 starting
defectors. Overall, each of the graphs in the final experiment showed the same thing: the
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increasing number of defectors leads to higher defection rates for the paranoid agents, but it leads
to a lower rate of population growth for paranoia agents.
When comparing the end population of paranoid agents at 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%
resource population, it is seen that with increasing resources, the overall number of paranoia
agents at the end of the trial decreases (a finding that was also observed in the baseline and
environmental experiments). At 25% resource density, the end defection rate is around 55% (at
20 defector agents), and at 0 defector agents, the defection rate is 0%. The number of paranoia
agents at 25% oscillates as the number of defectors are increased in the population. The peak is
seen at 3 defector agents in the population, where the number of paranoia agents is 1600.
At 50% resource density, clearer patterns are observed with the changing number of
defectors. The peak number of agents was seen when there were 0 defectors at the start: 700,
while the lowest number of paranoia agents was seen when there were 20 defectors at the start:
450. When looking at the defection rate, the opposite trend was seen, the peak was seen with 19
starting defectors, with a paranoia rate of 55%, while the lowest defection rate of 0% was seen
with 0 starting defectors.
The same essential pattern was seen at 75% resource density, with the max defection rate
of 50% occurring at 19 starting defector agents, and the max ending paranoia population of 320
paranoia agents occurring at 4 starting defectors, while the minimum ending paranoia population
of 220 agents occurring at 14 starting defectors.
At 100% resource density, the largest end population of paranoid agents was 190, and
was seen at a starting defector population of 3, while the lowest 150, seen at a starting defector
population of 19. The defection rate of paranoia agents increased from 0% at 0 starting defector
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population to 50% defection rate with a starting defector population of 20. These results are
summarized in Table 3 (see Appendix D).
The models’ results show that average neighborhood resource levels and crime are each
key components of the development of paranoid behavior. The paranoid behavior displayed by
the agents, however, is not high enough to indicate potential psychosis-- that is, the rate of
defection for the paranoid agents remained at or below 60%. These results showed that there was
a direct relationship between crime and paranoid behavior. In addition, there was an inverse
relationship between neighborhood resources and paranoid behavior, and at low resource
densities, this relationship was strengthened further with the addition of crime. Finally, there was
an inverse relationship between neighborhood resources and crime. This was seen in a
comparison of Figure 1 (which measures end defection rate in relation to resource level changes
without the presence of defectors) and Figure 3 (the same thing with the presence of defectors).
Without the presence of crime, as in Figure 1, the model showed that a decreased level of
resources is linked to an increased level of paranoia. However, the defection rate quickly
plummeted when the resource level was increased slightly. On the other hand, in Figure 3, the
defection rate of paranoia in the presence of greed-based defectors (crime) stayed elevated, even
when the resource density increased. Therefore, both poverty and crime appear to be factors that
can lead to levels of paranoid behavior above that needed to indicate schizophrenia.
Discussion:
The original intent of the paper was to explore the relationship between resource density,
crime, and paranoid behavior, and this was accomplished using agent based modeling. It is worth
reiterating that in this model, while there are individuals who display paranoia that could be
indicative of schizophrenia, an essential component of schizophrenia requires the ability to
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understand the internal state of the agent, and this cannot be measured with an agent-based
model. While on the surface, the results supported the hypothesis, the model illuminated the
relationship between crime, poverty, and paranoid behavior, in a way that was unexpected. It was
observed that while poverty is related with paranoid behavior, it is triggered by crime, and this
effect can keep paranoid behavior elevated across neighborhood resource levels.
As elaborated upon in the Introduction, there are several symptoms associated with the
presence of schizophrenia, but this model focused on paranoia. According to Yiend (2018),
paranoid symptoms are correlated with negative interpretation bias, which is the tendency to
view ambiguous situations as threatening, or negative. Negative interpretation bias is one of the
key factors psychologists and psychiatrists look for to determine future psychosis, and it was the
symptom used to misdiagnose an entire generation of Black men during the Civil Rights Era.
The fact that this symptom remains in the current DSM implies despite its contentious history
means that it should be evaluated in more depth.
This paper contributes to our understanding of the multitude of environmental factors that
can play a role in the development of schizophrenia. Head injury, child abuse, and other adverse
child rearing experiences have been known to contribute to future psychosis (Dean, 2005), as
have dopamine sensitization and drug abuse. Additionally, it is clear that environmental factors
like housing, poor job prospects, and high crime can influence the presence of schizophrenic
symptoms. The current research adds low resources and crime to the list. However,
schizophrenia is a complicated disease, and not everyone who is exposed to these factors will
develop it. The model exists to highlight the fact that a more nuanced discussion is needed. Some
individuals exposed to an environment with poor housing, high crime and low resource density
will exhibit adaptive traits to survive in that environment, while others might be more adversely
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affected and develop a mental health disease. Each of these individuals are suffering from their
circumstances and a better understanding of their needs is required to properly treat them.
Future Directions:
Despite the already interesting findings, it is worthwhile to understand this as well in
context of other social situations where non-clinical paranoia is seen. One of these examples is,
as commonly termed, White paranoia. There are ample examples of White paranoia, where
typically White, upper class individuals view a heterogeneous group as dangerous in the intent of
protecting their wealth/resources/status, as was seen with the McCloskey case. This behavior is
not classified as a mental illness but sociologically looks similar to other mental illnesses, like
paranoid schizophrenia, therefore making it similar to nonclinical paranoia. In these situations,
there is a sustained high paranoia, even in areas where crime is not present and resource density
is high. It would appear then that the paranoid behavior displayed is not a function of the
environment. This is because the concept of White paranoia is different from other
understandings of paranoia. White paranoia is, generally, a learned behavior. White paranoia
consists of the individual trying to anticipate the actions of others--it is fear of retribution by the
Black population for the previous decades of mistreatment by Whites (Berke, 173).
In future explorations of White paranoia, a similar model could be changed to create a
separate set of agents who look like defectors, but act like cooperators, or tit-for-tat individuals,
along with a differentiated area where the “White” agents live. There are several steps to this
type of model. This would be done by maintaining a dictionary containing the different types of
agents, and the behaviors that the paranoid agent believes that opponent/partner would do. This
dictionary would be the equivalent of a stereotype. Apart from the “White” agents, all of the
agents would have the tit-for-tat behavior (the behavior that most closely resembles human
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interaction), but the “White” agent would expect a certain behavior based on the color of the
opposing agent (for example, a blue agent would look like a defector but in reality be imbibed
with the tit-for-tat behavior). Each paranoia agent can maintain a hash table that contains the
interaction details, specifically, the color of the partner, the behavior the paranoid agent guessed,
and then the partner’s actual behavior. For each paranoia agent, a score can be maintained that
contains the number of times the behavior of the paranoia agent’s partner wasn’t equivalent to
the stereotyped behavior. This model can also be elevated further by accounting for the principle
of private property, and creating an interaction whenever an agent lands on the specified
resources of the paranoia agent. Agents would analyze and guess their partner’s behavior based
on the color of the agents, and this behavior would not be subject to easy change based on
experience. This can be done by altering the interaction model such that the paranoid agents
preempt the actions of their partner, and then having the paranoid agents model their behavior
based on what they believe that agent would do. For example, if a particular paranoia agent
encountered a blue agent, and to the paranoid agent, the behavior of blue agents was to defect,
then the paranoid agent would also defect to try to win that interaction, regardless of what the
blue agent actually does.
Another potential idea to take the model forward, apart from studying different types of
paranoid behavior, would be to develop a better understanding of what environmental factors can
lead to positive and negative symptoms of paranoia. Previous studies do not cover the
relationship between paranoia and poverty in much depth, as seen with the papers discussed in
the Introduction and Methods section. The closest is the paper by Wilson et al (2016), which
looked at crime and paranoia. It was found that there was a relationship between neighborhood
crime and paranoid behavior, even across other demographic changes like age, gender, and race.
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In addition, the paper explicitly states that crime rates did not correlate with other positive
psychosis symptoms (Wilson, 58), which specified the environmental factors to paranoia, not
potential schizophrenia. A little bit of research has been done to that effect, but certainly not
through an agent-based modeling, making it difficult to determine certainty. A paper from 2011
states that there is a relationship between household income and mental disorders. The paper
came to the conclusion that the presence of Axis II mental disorders (which includes
schizophrenia and other psychosis disorders) was correlated with an income below 20,000 a
year. In addition, the authors note that “ A few mental disorders were associated with every level
of decrease in income (ie, bipolar disorder, social phobia, nicotine dependence, paranoid PD,
schizoid PD, schizotypal PD, and borderline PD)” (Sareen, 2011). The model and the Sareen
paper could be taken further by examining the presence of a causative relationship between wage
decrease and paranoid behavior. This could be done by expanding the “score” to be closer to a
modifiable “wage” that affects the interactions between agents.
Another way to take the current model further is to explore the relationship between
poverty and schizophrenia not using an agent based model, but rather using real world data. This
would work by first recruiting individuals who were suffering from prodromal schizophrenia
symptoms, specifically paranoia. These individuals would probably be around 3-4 on the SIPS
scale. Then, their score could be compared to their neighborhood where they lived, and the
relative poverty and the crime of that area.
Conclusion:
Overall, this paper has shown that there is a relationship between poverty and the
presence of non clinical paranoia, through exacerbated crime. While the psychological details of
paranoia are hard to model due to the limitations of a computer based model, it is clear that
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poverty is an environmental factor that leads to the development of nonclinical paranoia. The
model could be elaborated in the future to look at disease progression and the environmental
factors that lead to psychotic disorders, either from a neurological, or sociological perspective.
This aim of this paper is not to discredit the notion that environmental factors can contribute to
the presence of psychotic disorders, but rather present a nuanced depiction of the interaction
between disease and environmental factors, where healthcare providers consider the context of
their patient, thereby reducing the disparities in healthcare between different races and classes.
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Appendix A
Prisoners Dilemma Payoff Model when played 1 time as opposed to the payoff within the
context of the agent based model.
Table 1
Payoff in the Prisoner’s Dilemma with 2 individuals
Partner Defects

Partner Cooperates

Agent defects

6 months each incarcerated

Agent gets 0 years Partner
gets 8 years

Agent Cooperates

Agent gets 8 years. Partner
gets 0 years.

Both agents spend 4 years

Note: Table 1 shows the payoff if the Prisoners Dilemma game was played once. These are the
general rules.
Table 2, on the other hand, has modified Table 1 to occur over further interactions. Now
the currency is not jail time--it is resource value units (what the agent needs to survive). The
interaction was modified to only occur on resource patches--areas of the environment where
agents are able to procure a resource unit.
Table 2,
The Distribution of a Resource Unit in the Event Two Agents Land on The Same Resource Patch
Partner Cooperates

Partner Defects

Turtle Cooperates

(½, ½)

(0,1)

Turtle Defects

(1, 0)

(0,0)

Note: (Outcome written as (Turtle, Partner)). Turtle is synonymous with Agent.
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Appendix B
The Graphs that correspond to the Baseline Experiment Results
Figure 1
Graph Of The Average Defection Rate Of Paranoia Agents At The End Of The Trial At Each
Resource Density

Note: The baseline experiments looked at the correlation between paranoid behavior and
resource density without the effect of crime. Resource densities increased in 5% increments. Ten
trials were conducted at each resource density; the value presented at each resource density is
averaged across the 10 trials and across paranoia agents at that trial.
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Figure 2
Graph of Average Number of Paranoia Agents at the End of the Trial Against varying Resource
Densities in the Baseline Experiment

Note: The baseline experiments looked at the correlation between paranoid behavior and
resource density without the effect of crime. Resource densities increased in 5% increments. Ten
trials were conducted at each resource density; the value presented at each resource density is
averaged across the 10 trials and across paranoia agents at that trial.
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Appendix C
The Graphs that Correspond to the Environmental Experiment
Figure 3
Average Defection Rate of Paranoia Agents at the End of the Trial Across Resource Densities in
the Environmental Experiment.

Note: The environmental experiments include the addition of crime. Ten trials were conducted at
each resource density; the value presented at each resource density is averaged across the 10
trials and across paranoia agents at that trial.
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Figure 4
Count of Defectors, Cooperators and Paranoia Agents at the End of the Trial in the
Environmental Experiment, Across Resource Densities

Note: The environmental experiments include the addition of crime. Ten trials were conducted at
each resource density; the value presented at each resource density is averaged across the 10
trials and across paranoia agents at that trial.
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Appendix D
A Table that presents the Results of the Combined Experiment.
Table 3
The Results of the Combined Experiment, at 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% resource density.
Lowest average
defection rate,
size of defector
population

Highest average
defection rate,
size of defector
population

Smallest average
population size,
size of defector
population

Largest average
population size,
size of defector
population

0% resource
density

40%, 0

40%, 0

20, 0

20, 0

25% resource
density

0%, 0

55%, 19

1000, 19

1600, 3

50% resource
density

0%, 0

55%, 19

450, 20

700, 0

75% resource
density

0%, 0

50%, 19

220,15

320, 4

100% resource
density

0%, 0

50%, 20

150, 19

200, 3

Note: This table shows the results for the combined experiment which modified both defectors
and resources

